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The  lack  of  integration  of health-care  sectors  and  specialist  groups  is widely  accepted  as  a
necessity to effectively  address  the  most  urgent  challenges  in  modern  health  care  systems.
Germany  follows  a more  decentralized  approach  that  allows  for many  degrees  of  freedom.
With  its latest  bill, the  German  government  has introduced  several  measures  to  explicitly
foster  the  integration  of health-care  services.  This article  presents  the  historic  develop-
ment  of integrated  care  services  and  offers  insights  into  the  construction  of  integrated  care
programs  in the German  health-care  system.  The  measures  of  integrated  care  within  the
Health  Care  Strengthening  Act  are  presented  and  discussed  in detail  from  the perspective
of the  provider,  the  payer,  and  the  political  arena.  In addition,  the  effects  of the  new  act  are
assessed  using  scenario  technique  based  on  an  analysis  of the  effects  of  previously  imple-
mented  health  policy  reforms.  Germany  now  has  a ﬂourishing  integrated  care  scene  with
many integrated  care  programs  being  able  to contain  costs  and  improve  quality.  Although
it will  be  still  a long  journey  for Germany  to reach  the  coordination  of  care  standards  set
by leading  countries  such  as the  United  Kingdom,  New  Zealand  or  Switzerland,  interna-
tional  health  policy  makers  may  deliberately  and  selectively  adopt  elements  of the German
approach  such as  the  extensive  freedom  of contract,  the  strong  patient-focus  by  allowing
for very  need-driven  and  regional  solutions,  or the  substantial  start-up  funding  allowing  for
more  unproven  and  progressive  endeavors  to further  improve  their  own  health  systems.
©  2016  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd. This  is  an  open  access  article  under
Y-NC-Nthe  CC  B
. Background
The integration of health-care services across sectors
s broadly accepted as a necessity to effectively address
he most urgent challenges in Western health care sys-
ems, such as the aging population, the increase in chronic
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conditions, rising expenditures, and the scarcity of medical
services in rural areas [1–5]. Similar to other countries with
a Statutory Health Insurance (SHI) system, the lack of coop-
eration between various sectors and specialist groups has
been a persistent problem in Germany [1,6–8]. However,
to date, strengthening the integration of different sectors
has had limited success [1,9]. In 2013, The Commonwealth
Fund ranked Germany lowest after Sweden out of eleven
OECD countries in the category of ‘Coordinated Care’ [10].
Germany’s challenges to integrate care are not
unique and shared with most OECD countries that
have also experimented with different approaches,
such as pay-for-performance, bundled payments, and
disease management programs [11–13]. The German
cess article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
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approach grants high degrees of freedom to payers and
providers in designing new models of care and there-
fore facilitates competition and innovation. On July 10th,
2015, the German parliament passed its latest bill to
strengthen the delivery of health-care services within the
SHI system. The Health Care Strengthening Act [GKV-
Versorgungsstärkungsgesetz] places high importance on
the integration of health-care services across different sec-
tors and promotes the “demand-based, nationwide, and
accessible” delivery of high quality health-care services
[8]. Looking back on more than a decade of experience
in reforming integrated care, this study aims to share
lessons learned of the German approach across countries
and health systems.
2. Integrated care in Germany: freedom of contract
as basic principle
Integrated care programs (ICPs) (§  140a social code book
V (SGB V)) were introduced as an important element of the
Health Care Reform Act [GKV-Gesundheitsreformgesetz]
in 2000 [14]. The rather narrow German deﬁnition of
ICPs differs substantially from its wider international
understanding [15–17]. For example, ICPs do not include
centrally governed disease management programs (DMP)
that are codiﬁed separately in §  137f SGB V. However,
within ICPs, the German interpretation is much wider as it
allows for a large ﬂexibility and experimenting. The basic
premise of ICPs is that providers from various sectors form
an integrated care network (ICN); e.g., a hospital forms an
ICN with outpatient physicians, psychologists, psychother-
apists, and social workers to prevent re-hospitalizations
and thus optimizes the quality of life for patients suffering
from schizophrenia [18]. These networks or the individ-
ual providers then create an integrated care contract (ICC)
with a payer, i.e.,  a sickness fund, and provide the nego-
tiated services to the patient (see Fig. 1). Within ICPs, all
contracting partners enjoy a high degree of freedom. ICNs
and payers are free to negotiate payment schemes, the pro-
vision of care as well as the type and scope of potential
evaluations. Providers, payers, and patients have no obli-
gation to take part or enroll in an ICP. In most ICPs, patients
are incentivized to participate by non-ﬁnancial incentives,
e.g., by the promise of better quality and access to care and
shorter waiting times; however, in some cases, patients
may  be offered a ﬁnancial bonus for compliance, such as
an exemption from co-payments for pharmaceuticals and
medical devices [19]. ICPs are very diverse in nature due
to the large degrees of freedom. Interested readers may
be referred to the ‘Gesundes Kinzigtal’ as an example of
a population based ICP [1,20] or to a program on recurrent
osteoporotic fractures as an example of an indication based
ICP [21].
3. The development of Integrated Care Networks
has come to a haltAlthough introduced in 2000, the substantial uptake of
ICPs effectively started in 2004 following the Health Care
Modernization Act [GKV-Modernisierungsgesetz] [22].
This act made three major changes to ICPs: ﬁrst, itFig. 1. Integrated Care Program (ICP), Integrated Care Networks (ICN) and
Integrated Care Contracts (ICC).
abolished the need for approval from the Regional Asso-
ciation of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians (RASHIP),
which was regarded as the main obstacle to creating ICPs
by sickness funds and independent providers. Second, the
government introduced generous start-up funding that
allowed sickness funds to withhold up to 1% of the in- and
outpatient budget, i.e.,  EUR 460 m p.a. originating from the
inpatient and EUR 220 m p.a. from the outpatient budget
from 2004 to 2006 [23,24]. The period was  later extended to
2008 by the Physician Amendment Act [Vertragsarztrecht-
sänderungsgesetz] in 2006 [25]. Third, the need to adjust
the in- and outpatient budgets was waived, which sub-
stantially relaxed requirements of ﬁnancial viability and
reduced bureaucratic effort. Budget adjustments are espe-
cially for RASHIPs of large effort, because these bodies are
responsible to allocate the budget at individual physician
level. Therefore the RASHIPs have not only to solve the
resource distribution conﬂicts between different special-
ties but also within a specialty, i.e.,  between physicians
taking and not-taking part in ICPs. As such a breakdown
makes use of allocation keys, it is never considered fair
from the viewpoint of all affected physicians. Therefore, the
adjustments caused many conﬂicts and disputes within the
RASHIPs.
In addition, the eligible contract partners have also been
extended by several amendments since 2000. While ini-
tially, only inpatient care providers, rehabilitation facilities,
RASHIPs, and networks of outpatient providers were enti-
tled to form an ICN, this restriction was steadily relaxed.
In 2004, the need to close a contract with a network
of outpatient physicians was abolished, and contracts
between sickness funds and individual physicians were
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Table  1
Number of contracts, participants and expenditure 2008–2011.
Year No. of registered contracts Enrollees participating Expenditures [EUR million]
2008 6400 1,661,283 1225
2009  6262 1,635,270 1224
2010  6374 1,771,949 1353
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ource: Bundesregierung (2012) [6].
llowed. In addition, outpatient clinics [Medizinisches
ersorgungszentrum] have been added to the list of eligi-
le contract partners, while RASHIPs have been excluded.
hen, in 2007, nursing homes became entitled to become
ontract partners, and in 2011, pharmaceutical companies
nd manufacturers of medical devices were added (see
able 2).
Following these changes, the number of contracts and
articipating enrollees increased rapidly from 679,000
nrolled in 2004 to 1,661,283 in 2008 [6,22]. During the
ame time, total ﬁnancial capacity used for ICPs increased
rom EUR 248 million in 2004 to EUR 1225 million in 2008
6,22]. Costs per patient varied widely, as few ICPs covered
 large share of patients with a comparatively low budget.
ut of the total of 6400 ICPs in 2008, 32 ICPs accounted
or more than 90% of all enrollees but for only 17% of the
otal ICP expenditure [22]. The ﬁgures may  be skewed due
o the fact that only services that go beyond the general
ealth beneﬁt basket are counted as ICP expenditure, i.e.,
he effect of ICPs providing an expensive non-reimbursed
ighly specialized treatment to a small number of peo-
le is analyzed together with the effect of large scale
CPs that provide additional non-expensive services, e.g.,
creening tests. However, as evaluation of ICPs on the
ggregate level is scarce and more recent data is not avail-
ble, conclusions based on this data have to be drawn with
are.
Since the cessation of start-up funding at the end
f 2008, the growth of ICPs has slowed down, as ICPs
hat did not demonstrate improved quality and efﬁciency
ame under pressure. Later, the enactment of the Health
are Provision Act [GKV-Versorgungsstrukturgesetz] [26]
n 2012 further decelerated uptake because it obliged
ickness funds to calculate and guarantee savings for each
CP in order to obtain permission from the Federal Insur-
nce Authority [Bundesversicherungsamt].
By the end of 2011, 6339 ICPs with 1,926,133 enrollees
emained nationwide (see Table 1). The overall ICP budget
otaled to EUR 1352 million in 2011 [6]. This was primarily
pent on inpatient treatment (45%), followed by outpatient
are (35%), and pharmaceuticals (10%) [6].
To date, most ICPs involve at least one inpatient provider
nd one outpatient physician, whereas other eligible
roviders, such as outpatient clinics, acute and rehabili-
ation hospitals, long-term care facilities, pharmaceutical
ompanies, and medical device manufacturers, are usu-
lly less represented. Grothaus (2009) found that 64% of
he ICPs included outpatient physicians and 54% included
ospitals [22]. Pharmaceutical companies, medical device
anufacturers, and rehabilitation hospitals were found to
e involved in 13%, 11%, and 1% of all ICPs, respectively [6].926,133 1352
4. The new Health Care Strengthening Act lowers
barriers for ICPs
The new Health Care Strengthening Act introduces sev-
eral changes to foster the implementation of ICPs. First,
the legal basis of ICPs is aligned with the legal frame-
works of other forms of selective contracting, i.e.,  so-called
‘structure contracts’ (§73a SGB V) and ‘special outpatient
physician contracts’ (§73c SGB V). This extension of the
ICP understanding alleviates the prerequisite for cross-
sectoral cooperation because those contracts often cover
only one specialty within one health-care sector, e.g., out-
patient surgery. Second, new start-up funding is provided
for innovative ICPs, totaling approximately EUR 300 million
annually (Innovationsfonds, §§  92a-92b SGB V), whereof
EUR 75 million is reserved for evaluation and health
service research. Its objective is to foster programs that
improve cross-sectoral collaboration or to promote inno-
vative programs such as telemedicine, the provision of
care in rural areas or projects that improve drug safety
for multi-morbid patients. Compared to the start-up fund-
ing granted in 2004–2008, there are major differences.
Decisions on grant allocations are now made by a subcom-
mittee of the Joint Federal Committee, Germany’s highest
decision-making body of self-administration. This subcom-
mittee consists of 10 members that represent providers,
payers, and government ofﬁcials. The funds are only avail-
able for health-care services that exceed the budgeted
standard care and that have the potential to be imple-
mented in the beneﬁt basket of standard care in the future.
Funds are granted for measures that increase health ser-
vices quality and efﬁciency, reduce care gaps, improve
the collaboration between sectors, providers, and staff
groups, or foster inter- and multidisciplinary cooperation.
In addition projects are favored that promise transfer-
ability of the results to other conditions and regions,
projects with a favorable cost-beneﬁt ratio, and project
that promise good assessability. The draft bill mentioned
especially telemedicine projects, health services solutions
for rural areas, improvement of geriatric care, and drug
safety programs. However, until now further details on
the requirements for application process has not been
deﬁned in detail. The EUR 680 million p.a. start-up fund-
ing granted in the years 2004–2008 included services
that were budgeted in standard care, and thus the EUR
300 million now granted per annum is considered to
be a far larger budget. Third, budget adjustment proce-
dures are simpliﬁed, as sickness funds and RASHIPs are
no longer obliged to adjust their budgets based on the
number and the morbidity of the patients. Both parties
can agree on a general ﬂat budget adjustment or can even
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Table 2
Evolution of integrated care regulation.
Jan 2000 Jan 2004/Jan 2007 Apr 2007/Jan 2011/Jan 2012 Jul 2015
Legal basis • Health Care Reform Act
[GKV-Gesundheits-reformgesetz]
[14]
• Health Care Modernization Act
[GKV-Modernisieruns-gesetz] [23]
• Physician Amendment Act [Ver-
tragsarztrechtsänderungsgesetz]
[25]
• Competition Reinforcement Act
[GKV-Wettbewerbs-
stärkungsgesetz] [27]
• Pharmaceutical Market
Restructuring Act
[Arzneimittelmarkt-
neuordnungsgesetz (AMNOG)] [28]
• Health Care Provision Act
[GKV-Versorgungsstrukturgesetz]
[26]
• Health Care Strengthening Act
[GKV-Versorgungs-
stärkungsgesetz]
[28]
Key elements • Introduces ICPs as cross-sectoral
modes of care (population and
indication based programs)
•  Provides framework agreement
between the National Association
of  SHI Physicians and the seven
National Associations of Sickness
Funds
•  Regulates content,
reimbursement, quality standards
and budget adjustment
• Requires obligatory ICP approval
of the RASHIPs
• Removes need for framework
agreement
• Introduces start-up funding for
period 2004 to 2006
• Prolongs start-up funding for the
period 2007 to 2008
• Offers free disposition of start-up
funding between all eligible
contract partners
• Restricts disposition of start-up
funding to out- and inpatient care
in  2007
• Introduces necessity for
pre-approval of the ICPs by the
Federal Insurance Authority in
2012
• Removes necessity for
cross-sectoral design of ICPs
• Introduces need to demonstrate
economic viability after four years
•  Integrates previously separately
regulated ‘structure contracts’
(§73a SGB V) and ‘special
outpatient physician care’ (§73c
SGB V) into the integrated care
framework
•  Removes necessity for
pre-approval of ICPs by the
regulatory agency
Eligible  ICN partners • Networks of general
practitioners, specialist physicians,
and dentists
• Other outpatient providers incl.
their networks
•  RASHIPs
•  Hospitals
•  Rehabilitation centers
•  Alliances of the above-mentioned
partners
• Allows contracts with individual
general practitioners, specialist
physicians, and dentists
• Excludes RASHIPs as eligible
contract partner
• Added outpatient clinics as
eligible partners in 2004
• Added long-term care facilities
and their payers (long-term care
funds) as eligible partners in 2007
• Added pharmaceutical companies
and manufacturers of medical
devices as eligible partners in 2011
• Reintroduces RASHIPs as eligible
contract partners
Budget  adjustment • Adjustment of in- and outpatient
budgets necessary based on
number of patients to stabilize
contribution rates
• Waived adjustment of in- and
outpatient budget for period
2004–2008
• Introduces necessity for budget
adjustment based on number of
patients and risk structure from
2009
• Simpliﬁes the adjustment
procedure by allowing a general
ﬂat budget adjustment and allows
waiving adjustment if efforts
exceed beneﬁt of adjustment
Financial  incentives • None • Allows start-up funding of up to
EUR 680 m p.a. (sickness funds are
allowed to withhold up to 1% of the
in- and outpatient budget)
• None • Reintroduces start-up funding of
up to EUR 300 m p.a. for the period
2016–2019 (sub-committee of
federal joint committee decides on
start-up funding)
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aive the budget adjustment if efforts exceed the ben-
ﬁt of adjustment. In addition, the adjustment can be
ade retroactively. Prospective budget adjustments were
lways challenging because the forecast often did not cor-
espond with the reality [29]. Fourth, RASHIPs are allowed
o become a contract partner within an ICP. This had been
eliberately precluded after 2004 because the government
anted to increase competition within the oligopolis-
ic outpatient provider market, which was dominated by
ASHIPs.
. No obstacles for the new legal basis of integrated
are
The Health Care Strengthening Act has passed through
he legislative procedure without any notable peculiarities.
he proposal was published by the German Federal Min-
stry of Health on February 25th, 2015 and passed the three
eadings in the German Bundestag and the two readings
n the German Bundesrat after 135 days. The bill passed
he last reading in the German Bundestag with a large
ajority. This was not surprising, as the current coali-
ion of Christian and Social Democrats holds 70% of the
otes in the German Parliament. The act was signed by
he President and came into effect at the end of July 23rd,
015.
Sickness funds generally supported the changes in inte-
rated care, as the new legislation lowers bureaucratic
ffort by merging ICPs with two other types of selective
ontracting and by removing the prerequisite of preap-
roval by the regulatory agency [30–33]. Some sickness
unds hoped for stronger deregulation around the budget
djustments, as this procedure often led to disputes with
he RASHIPs [30–33]. In addition, there were some discuss-
ons about the fund’s volume among several associations
f sickness funds. Some argued that a one-time payment of
UR 300 million would be sufﬁcient to revitalize ICP uptake,
hile others criticized the fund for being surprisingly high,
s they feared that the high subsidies could attract undesir-
ble projects that are not cost-efﬁcient [30,32,33]. Another
ajor point of criticism was the incongruence between the
ayment and allocation of funds; whereas sickness funds
ere obliged to ﬁnance half of the start-up funding, a sub-
ommittee of the federal joint committee determined the
esource allocation. The composition of this subcommit-
ee, consisting of three government ofﬁcials out of ten
embers, was particularly viewed critically, as the Ger-
an  social health-care system has a long tradition as being
elf-governed with a high degree of autonomy [31]. The
epresentation of all RASHIPs—the National Association of
tatutory Health Insurance Physicians (NASHIP)—also sup-
orted the changes made to ICPs, mainly because RASHIPs
ow became eligible as contract partners. However, the
ASHIP highlighted concerns about quality assurance in
CPs that include other services as standard care, the
lurred model of hospital and outpatient physicians, and
he high administrative effort arising from budget adjust-
ents [34].
Policy makers should be deliberate in designing new
egislation on integrated care and consider, balance, and
lign incentives with the overall regulatory framework.olicy 120 (2016) 445–451 449
As the German health system became fairly complex,
interactions and interrelations between different regula-
tions get more common. For example, the introduction
of surplus premiums in 2015 led to opposing incentives
for SHIs as the uptake of new ICPs comes often with
high initial investments with later payoffs. These initial
investments induced an increase in insurance premiums
and led therefore to high churn rates of price-sensitive
insurees.
6. Scenarios on the impact of the Health Care
Strengthening Act
The objective of the new act is to foster the integra-
tion of health-care services in Germany. It is not directly
apparent how the number of ICPs will develop as there is a
trade-off between higher start-up funding and the admin-
istrative burden resulting from the budget adjustment and
the mandatory evaluation. In an optimistic scenario, start-
up funding is the main driver of the ICP growth, the market
for ICPs is not yet saturated, and additional efforts due to
assessments and budget adjustment are completely offset
by the additional funding. A similar positive effect of start-
up funding was observed during the time of 2004–2008 in
Germany and ﬁnancial incentives have also been proved to
be an important facilitator of integrated care in other Euro-
pean countries [35,36]. This environment will make many
new ICNs enter the market, and the strong increase in ICPs
as seen in 2004–2008 would be repeated. In a rather pes-
simistic scenario, it comes to a consolidation of ICPs in a
saturated market. RASHIPs would fully make use of their
new eligibility as contract partners and drive smaller ICNs
with less market power out of the market. The plurality of
different providers and services would decline, as RASHIPs
have the power to replace numerous small competitors
with a single contract. In the short-term, large providers
may  be considered beneﬁcial for sickness funds because of
lower transaction costs. In addition, the administrative bar-
riers to obtain start-up funding may  be too high for smaller
ICNs. The result would be a decline in the number of ICPs,
although the number of enrolled patients may  increase
or stabilize. Both of the sketched scenarios will proba-
bly not reﬂect reality in four years’ time. In general, the
new act comes with substantially higher start-up funding
compared to 2004–08 but also with higher administrative
needs in terms of evaluation and budget adjustment. If one
notes that only a fraction of the earlier start-up funding has
been used for integrated care contracts, it is very likely that
the funds that are provided in the upcoming period will
be sufﬁcient and effective to attract new ICPs. However, as
the administrative barriers to accessing start-up funding
especially regarding evaluation are higher, only promis-
ing projects will be realized. In addition, the obligation
to transfer successful programs from selective contracts
to standard care will restrain innovative providers from
applying for funding because payers and ICNs will lose their
unique selling points. Sickness funds and providers will
most likely apply for funds to improve IT infrastructure,
which is underdeveloped compared to other countries [37]
but an important driver in the integration of health-care
services [38].
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7. Conclusion
The decentralized German approach, supported by sub-
stantial start-up funding has shown to unleash creative
ideas to re-design integrated care of different sectors. With
more than 6400 ICPs, Germany has now a ﬂourishing inte-
grated care scene with many ICPs being able to contain
costs or improve quality (e.g., in schizophrenia [18,39], car-
diovascular diseases [40], or in population based settings
[41,42]). However, the huge number of programs makes it
difﬁcult to identify the most promising ICPs-especially as
evaluations on quality and cost savings are often not pub-
licly available. There is especially little evidence publicly
available if ICPs fail because of a low number of participants,
lack of cooperation between providers, lack of manage-
ment capacity, or unfavorable results regarding outcomes.
A mandatory reporting of a set of pre-deﬁned and aligned
quality indicators might improve the situation.
Time will show whether the government set the right
course for improving the integration of health-care services
in Germany. Certainly, the government satisﬁed long-
standing demands for new start-up funding for innovative
programs and lower administrative barriers. Experience
from other countries, such as Austria, Spain, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom, shows that integrated care requires
a proactive government to overcome its barriers [35].
Even if the most optimistic scenario unfolds, it will be
still a long journey for Germany to reach coordination of
care standards set by the leading countries such as the
United Kingdom, New Zealand or Switzerland [10]. How-
ever, although Germany lags behind other countries in
integration of care, the Germany has succeeded in creating
a fruitful environment for innovative integrated healthcare
solutions. Therefore, international health policy makers
may  deliberately and selectively adopt elements of the Ger-
man  approach such as the extensive freedom of contract,
the strong patient-focus by allowing for very need-driven
and regional solutions, or the substantial start-up funding
allowing for more unproven and progressive endeavors to
further improve their own health systems.
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